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On the structure and function of scientific theories
Science Progress (1933-)
Vol. 54, No. 213 (January 1966), pp. 1-12
Published by: Science Reviews 2000 Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43419493
Page Count: 12
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In so far as scientific progress consists in the creation of theories, it not only increases our understanding of what there is, but adds new objects to it, which are themselves a possible subject-matter for investigation, especially of logico-philosophical analysis. In the last hundred years progress in this field has been largely due to the development of logic, which has provided the philosopher of science with sharpened analytical tools. In this essay it is—in outline—shown, how modern logic is employed in analysing scientific theories; and it is argued that in order to gain a better understanding of their function, the logical analysis of theories must be supplemented by a logical analysis of those parts of empirical discourse in which experimental and observational findings are formulated before they are, in idealized form, incorporated into theories.
Science Progress (1933-) © 1966 Science Reviews 2000 Ltd.