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The Consequences of Independence: Functions and Resources of State Legislative Fiscal Offices
Anita Chadha, Anne Permaloff and Robert A. Bernstein
State & Local Government Review
Vol. 33, No. 3 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 202-207
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4355295
Page Count: 6
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All 50 states have some form of Legislative Fiscal Office (LFO), whether dual or joint, to ensure that independence between the legislature and the executive is maintained. This article reports the results of a survey of state LFOs and uses bivariate comparisons and regression analyses of seven variables to examine the scope of budgetary functions performed by dual and joint state LFOs. Dual LFOs perform more functions than do joint LFOs. They also have larger staffs per legislator; hence, they command greater total staff resources per state than do joint LFOs. Both findings are supportive of the Madisonian view that competition between chambers and their agencies drives dual offices to expand the scope of their functions and the resources they are allocated. Each dual office strives to perform functions and control resources that are not only as expansive as those of the executive but as expansive as those of the other chamber.
State & Local Government Review © 2001 Sage Publications, Inc.