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The Influence of Elections on Special District Revenue Policies: Special Democracies or Automatons of the State?
State & Local Government Review
Vol. 37, No. 3 (2005), pp. 193-205
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4355402
Page Count: 13
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Special districts present a stark contrast in governing arrangements: just over half are overseen by elected officials while the rest are run by appointees. Despite this contrast, political scientists have generally ignored the role played by district governance in determining district policies. This study finds that the presence of elected officials on a district's governing board leads to a reduced reliance upon property taxes for revenues. Using U.S. Bureau of the Census datasets, the author demonstrates that board elections are an effective means by which local residents may influence district policies. In addition, the study finds some support for the contention that large, regional governments benefit from an economy of scale.
State & Local Government Review © 2005 Sage Publications, Inc.