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Was wird in Kants "Grundlegung" eigentlich deduziert? Über einen Grund der vermeintlichen Dunkelheit des „Dritten Abschnitts“

Bernd Ludwig
Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics
Vol. 16, Themenschwerpunkt: Kants Metaphysik der Sitten im Kontext der Naturrechtslehre des 18. Jahrhunderts / Kant's Doctrine of Right in the Context of Eighteenth Century Natural Law (2008), pp. 431-463
Published by: Duncker & Humblot GmbH
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43579365
Page Count: 33
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Was wird in Kants "Grundlegung" eigentlich deduziert? Über einen Grund der vermeintlichen Dunkelheit des „Dritten Abschnitts“
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Abstract

At least since the publication of H. J. Paton's commentary The Categorical Imperative (1946) the „deduction of the categorical imperative“ in the third chapter is a much discussed matter in the literature on Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A closer view on Kant's explicit indications towards deduction(s), however, proves that such an „imperative“-deduction (whatever one may actually understand by this) has neither been announced nor delivered by Kant himself. In the third chapter, Kant rather discusses two „idea“-deductions, which are — as it reveals — the systematic foundation of the whole argumentation. In view of the structure of this argumentation the third chapter's actual role can be determined precisely (and in a way not tested interpretatorically before) for the first time. The much lamented „darkness“ of the text turns out to be to a large extent the consequence of inadequate expectations towards the text. On the side it becomes clear, at which point Kant distances himself from the Groundwork in Critique of Practical Reason (and already in the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason) and what the relationship between both concepts is.

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