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Government Balances as a Monetary Policy Instrument in the Less Developed Countries

A. G. Chandavarkar
Economic and Political Weekly
Vol. 7, No. 35 (Aug. 26, 1972), pp. 1785+1787+1789-1790
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4361736
Page Count: 4
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Government Balances as a Monetary Policy Instrument in the Less Developed Countries
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Abstract

A detailed analysis of the scope and limitations of the manipulation of the size and location of government balances as an instrument of monetary policy is particularly pertinent in the context of the less developed countries which can ill-afford to forgo any potential instrument in their quest for more efficacious monetary and fiscal management. Such an analysis is also of interest in view of suggestions that the manipulations of government deposits can serve as an instrument of monetary policy in countries where open market operations are likely to be inefficient, while it is not likely to lead to the undesirable repercussions inherent in variable reserve requirement. This paper analyses the potential scope for manipulating government deposits as an instrument of monetary policy in underdeveloped countries. [The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of the International Monetary Fund.]

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