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Mixed Strategy Equilibria in n-Person Games with Entropie Criteria

Rodica Brânzei
Bulletin mathématique de la Société des Sciences Mathématiques de Roumanie
Nouvelle Série, Vol. 42 (90), No. 2 (1999), pp. 75-87
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/43678697
Page Count: 13
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Mixed Strategy Equilibria in n-Person Games with Entropie Criteria
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Abstract

In this paper we define a new class of noncooperative n-person game based on two kinds of uncertainty's measures from information theory, namely: the informational energy and Shannon's entropy. We prove that each such a game possesses a unique best reply mixed strategy equilibrium that is a tuple of mixed strategies from which unilateral deviation yields no profitable effect.

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