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Indo-Soviet Economic Relations: Danger Signals and False Expectations

B. M.
Economic and Political Weekly
Vol. 22, No. 30 (Jul. 25, 1987), pp. 1226-1227
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4377273
Page Count: 2
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Abstract

Even if the question of 'safeguards' attached to the supply of enriched uranium is side-stepped, the Soviet offer to put up two nuclear power plants in India is inconsistent with India's nuclear power programme and cannot but emasculate the country's progress so far in nuclear technology. Nor is the agreement on co-operation in science and technology signed during Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Moscow likely to significantly alter the fact that in the scheme of modernisation of the Indian economy to which Rajiv Gandhi subscribes the Soviet Union can have but a peripheral role.

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