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India-China Border Learning from History
Economic and Political Weekly
Vol. 38, No. 39 (Sep. 27 - Oct. 3, 2003), pp. 4101-4103
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4414072
Page Count: 3
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The main rule of 'The Great Game' on the India-China border for the previous 150 years was that it be played quietly and as surreptitiously as possible. In the 1950s these rules still seemed to prevail and the two contesting governments decided to keep the lid on the problems while jockeying for local advantage. On the surface it was all Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai and the practice of the Panchsheela philosophy, but underneath was the realisation that the titles to large tracts of territory under the control of both parties were under dispute. The lid blew off when in March 1959 the Dalai Lama fled to India and was given political asylum.
Economic and Political Weekly © 2003 Economic and Political Weekly