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Performance Agreements in US Government: Lessons for Developing Countries

Prajapati Trivedi
Economic and Political Weekly
Vol. 38, No. 46 (Nov. 15-21, 2003), pp. 4859-4864
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4414279
Page Count: 6
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Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Performance Agreements in US Government: Lessons for Developing Countries
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Abstract

A performance agreement is a document summarising the understanding between the US president and his cabinet secretary regarding the expected results and performance indicators for the concerned department. This article argues that performance agreements are an effective instrument for promoting a culture of accountability in the government and lauds the attempt by the US administration to introduce them systematically in the highest echelons of the government. However, due to technical flaws in their design, these instruments have proved to be ineffective. This experience provides valuable lessons for developing countries in search of effective instruments of accountability. A well-designed system of performance agreements can be a great instrument for transforming development goals into reality.

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