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Review: Imperfect Information and the Electoral Connection: The Logic of Congressional Action by Arnold, R. Douglas
Reviewed Works: The Logic of Congressional Action by Arnold, R. Douglas; Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981 by Hansen, John Mark
Review by: Steven P. Croley
Political Research Quarterly
Vol. 47, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 509-523
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/449022
Page Count: 15
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By exploring the consequences of imperfect information, R. Douglas Arnold and John Mark Hansen (both intellectual descendants of David Mayhew) make significant contributions to the rational-choice theory of legislator decision-making. Indeed, their books can be usefully understood as the latest stage in the evolution of that theory. Ultimately, however, their contributions to the theory are incomplete. While Arnold and Hansen both highlight an insufficiently emphasized issue, their particular arguments concerning the implications of imperfect information leave unanswered several important questions.
Political Research Quarterly © 1994 University of Utah