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Against Propositionalism

Michelle Montague
Noûs
Vol. 41, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 503-518
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4494543
Page Count: 16
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Against Propositionalism
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Abstract

'Propositionalism' is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations-all intentional attitudes-are relations to propositions or something proposition-like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate 'F'. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way they are, and that propositionalism must be abandoned.

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