Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

International Oligopoly and the Taxation of Commerce with Revenue-Constrained Governments

Andreas Haufler and Michael Pflüger
Economica
New Series, Vol. 74, No. 295 (Aug., 2007), pp. 451-473
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4541546
Page Count: 23
  • Download ($43.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
International Oligopoly and the Taxation of Commerce with Revenue-Constrained Governments
Preview not available

Abstract

We evaluate the incentives for strategic commodity tax-setting under destination and origin regimes when competition is imperfect and commodity taxes must be used to finance the government budget. Different cases of international duopoly are compared, where firms compete over quantities or prices and markets are segmented or integrated. In each setting the international spillovers of tax policy are isolated and evaluated at the Pareto-efficient tax rate. We find that origin-based commodity taxation leads to a downward competition of tax rates in each of the models analysed, whereas no similarly broad-based incentives for beggar-thy-neighbour policies exist under the destination principle.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[451]
    [451]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
452
    452
  • Thumbnail: Page 
453
    453
  • Thumbnail: Page 
454
    454
  • Thumbnail: Page 
455
    455
  • Thumbnail: Page 
456
    456
  • Thumbnail: Page 
457
    457
  • Thumbnail: Page 
458
    458
  • Thumbnail: Page 
459
    459
  • Thumbnail: Page 
460
    460
  • Thumbnail: Page 
461
    461
  • Thumbnail: Page 
462
    462
  • Thumbnail: Page 
463
    463
  • Thumbnail: Page 
464
    464
  • Thumbnail: Page 
465
    465
  • Thumbnail: Page 
466
    466
  • Thumbnail: Page 
467
    467
  • Thumbnail: Page 
468
    468
  • Thumbnail: Page 
469
    469
  • Thumbnail: Page 
470
    470
  • Thumbnail: Page 
471
    471
  • Thumbnail: Page 
472
    472
  • Thumbnail: Page 
473
    473