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The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 57, No. 226 (Jan., 2007), pp. 104-111
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4543206
Page Count: 8
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Many philosophers of mathematics are attracted by nominalism, the doctrine that there are no sets, numbers, functions or other mathematical objects. John Burgess and Gideon Rosen have put forward an intriguing argument against nominalism, based on the thought that philosophy cannot overrule internal mathematical and scientific standards of acceptability. I argue that Burgess and Rosen's argument fails because it relies on a mistaken view of what the standards of mathematics require.
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) © 2007 Oxford University Press