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Reasons, Resultance and Moral Particularism

Omar Edward Moad
The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-)
Vol. 57, No. 226 (Jan., 2007), pp. 112-116
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4543207
Page Count: 5
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Reasons, Resultance and Moral Particularism
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Abstract

According to Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism, the way in which a given moral reason functions as a reason for or against an action can vary from case to case. Dancy also asserts that reasons are resultance bases. But a reason why something ought to be done is that in virtue of which it is something that ought to be done. If the function of a reason can vary, then resultance bases cannot be reasons. Perhaps the particularist might conceive a reason not as a resultance base, but as a specific type of which a resultance base is a token. But this picture of reasons cannot be correct.

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