You are not currently logged in.
Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:
If You Use a Screen ReaderThis content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Why Externalism Is Not a Problem for Ethical Intuitionists
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
New Series, Vol. 99 (1999), pp. 77-90
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545296
Page Count: 14
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Preview not available
Ethical intuitionists are often criticised on the ground that their view makes it possible for an agent to believe that she ought to ? whilst lacking any motive to ?-that is, on the ground that it involves, or implies a form of externalism. I begin by distinguishing this form of externalism (what I call 'belief externalism') from two other forms of ethical externalism-moral externalism, and reasons externalism. I then consider various reasons why one might think that ethical intuitionism is defective in so far as it involves, or implies belief externalism, and argue that these objections are unpersuasive.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society © 1999 The Aristotelian Society