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Justification, Rule-Breaking and the Mind
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
New Series, Vol. 99 (1999), pp. 123-139
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545301
Page Count: 17
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Normativity, Internal relations, Cognitive psychology, Emotion, Visual perception, Mind, Perception theory, Psychology, Axiology, Intentionality
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The view that psychological episodes have a physical nature (physicalism) and the view that they have a mental nature (Cartesian dualism) can be distinguished from the view that they have a purely normative nature. I explore some strands of a distinct, fourth view: psychological episodes are what they are because of the actual and possible relations of defeasible justification in which they stand; defeasible justification is an internal relation; it is not at bottom a normative matter; rule-following presupposes such internal relations; to follow a rule is not to break it.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society © 1999 The Aristotelian Society