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A Merleau-Pontyian Critique of Husserl's and Searle's Representationalist Accounts of Action
Hubert L. Dreyfus
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Vol. 100 (2000), pp. 287-302
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545331
Page Count: 16
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Intentionality, Phenomenology, Representationalism, Unconscious mind, Acting, Volition, Movement perception, Phenomena, Causality, Tennis
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Husserl and Searle agree that, for a bodily movement to be an action, it must be caused by a propositional representation. Husserl's representation is a mental state whose intentional content is what the agent is trying to do; Searle thinks of the representation as a logical structure expressing the action's conditions of satisfaction. Merleau-Ponty criticises both views by introducing a kind of activity he calls motor intentionality, in which the agent, rather than aiming at success, feels drawn to reduce a felt tension. I argue that Searle can account for Merleau-Ponty's kind of coping only by broadening his notion of propositional representation to include indexicals, but that, in so doing, he covers up the way representational intentionality depends upon motor intentionality.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society © 2000 The Aristotelian Society