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Logic and Existence [Corrected Portion of an Article appearing in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 73 (1999)]

Ian Rumfitt and Timothy Williamson
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
New Series, Vol. 100 (2000), pp. 321-343
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Aristotelian Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545334
Page Count: 23
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Logic and Existence [Corrected Portion of an Article appearing in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 73 (1999)]
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Abstract

The paper defends the intelligibility of unrestricted quantification. For any natural number n, 'There are at least n individuals' is logically true, when the quantifier is unrestricted. In response to the objection that such sentences should not count as logically true because existence is contingent, it is argued by consideration of cross-world counting principles that in the relevant sense of 'exist' existence is not contingent. A tentative extension of the upward L?wenheim-Skolem theorem to proper classes is used to argue that a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic of unrestricted universal quantification results from adding all sentences of the form 'There are at least n individuals' as axioms to a standard axiomatization of the first-order predicate calculus.

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