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The Ability to Render Something False
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
New Series, Vol. 104 (2004), pp. 297-305
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545418
Page Count: 9
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In this paper I try to explicate the idiom '(An agent) x is able to render (the proposition) p false', which plays a crucial role in van Inwagen's Consequence Argument and which has been extensively discussed in the literature on it. However, the explications offered so far fail to meet some intuitive desiderata which an analysis of the notion should fulfil, as for example the desiderata that (i) nobody can render necessary falsehoods false and that (ii) nobody can render historical falsities false. I propose a novel analysis which deviates from the foregoing in employing an explanatory notion, the connector 'because'.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society © 2004 The Aristotelian Society