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The Formulation of Disjunctivism: A Response to Fish
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
New Series, Vol. 105 (2005), pp. 129-141
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545430
Page Count: 13
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Fish proposes that we need to elucidate what 'disjunctivism' stands for, and he also proposes that it stands for the rejection of a principle about the nature of experience that he calls the decisiveness principle. The present paper argues that his first proposal is reasonable, but then argues, in Section II, that his positive suggestion does not draw the line between disjunctivism and non-disjunctivism in the right place. In Section III, it is argued that disjunctivism is a thesis about the special nature of perceptual experience, and the thesis as elucidated here is then distinguished from and related to certain other ideas about perception, namely, direct realism and also McDowell's epistemological disjunctivism.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society © 2005 The Aristotelian Society