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The 'Old Evidence' Problem
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 42, No. 4 (Dec., 1991), pp. 547-555
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/687709
Page Count: 9
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This paper offers an answer to Glymour's 'old evidence' problem for Bayesian confirmation theory, and assesses some of the objections, in particular those recently aired by Chihara, that have been brought against that answer. The paper argues that these objections are easily dissolved, and goes on to show how the answer it proposes yields an intuitively satisfactory analysis of a problem recently discussed by Maher. Garber's, Niiniluoto's and others' quite different answer to Glymour's problem is considered and rejected, and the paper concludes with some brief reflections on the prediction/accommodation issue.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science © 1991 The British Society for the Philosophy of Science