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A Closer Look at the 'New' Principle

Michael Strevens
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 46, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 545-561
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/687897
Page Count: 17
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A Closer Look at the 'New' Principle
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Abstract

David Lewis, Michael Thau, and Ned Hall have recently argued that the Principal Principle--an inferential rule underlying much of our reasoning about probability--is inadequate in certain respects, and that something called the 'New Principle' ought to take its place. This paper argues that the Principle Principal need not be discarded. On the contrary, Lewis et al. can get everything they need--including the New Principle--from the intuitions and inferential habits that inspire the Principal Principle itself, while avoiding the problems that originally caused them to abandon that principle.

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