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Robert A. Wilson
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 47, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), pp. 303-316
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/687950
Page Count: 14
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Species, Natural kinds, Biological taxonomies, Common sense, Pluralist school, Philosophical realism, Biology, Biological sciences, Essentialism, Metaphysics
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This paper is a critical discussion of John Dupré's recent defence of promiscuous realism in Part 1 of his The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. It also discusses some more general issues in the philosophy of biology and science. Dupré's chief strategy of argumentation appeals to debates within the philosophy of biology, all of which concern the nature of species. While the strategy is well motivated, I argue that Dupré's challenge to essentialist and unificationist views about natural kinds is not successful. One conclusion is that an integrative conception of species is a real alternative to Dupré's pluralism.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science © 1996 The British Society for the Philosophy of Science