Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific Thought Experiment

Tamar Szabó Gendler
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Vol. 49, No. 3 (Sep., 1998), pp. 397-424
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/688082
Page Count: 28
  • Download ($42.00)
  • Cite this Item
Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific Thought Experiment
Preview not available

Abstract

By carefully examining one of the most famous thought experiments in the history of science--that by which Galileo is said to have refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones--I attempt to show that thought experiments play a distinctive role in scientific inquiry. Reasoning about particular entities within the context of an imaginary scenario can lead to rationally justified conclusions that--given the same initial information--would not be rationally justifiable on the basis of a straightforward argument.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
[397]
    [397]
  • Thumbnail: Page 
398
    398
  • Thumbnail: Page 
399
    399
  • Thumbnail: Page 
400
    400
  • Thumbnail: Page 
401
    401
  • Thumbnail: Page 
402
    402
  • Thumbnail: Page 
403
    403
  • Thumbnail: Page 
404
    404
  • Thumbnail: Page 
405
    405
  • Thumbnail: Page 
406
    406
  • Thumbnail: Page 
407
    407
  • Thumbnail: Page 
408
    408
  • Thumbnail: Page 
409
    409
  • Thumbnail: Page 
410
    410
  • Thumbnail: Page 
411
    411
  • Thumbnail: Page 
412
    412
  • Thumbnail: Page 
413
    413
  • Thumbnail: Page 
414
    414
  • Thumbnail: Page 
415
    415
  • Thumbnail: Page 
416
    416
  • Thumbnail: Page 
417
    417
  • Thumbnail: Page 
418
    418
  • Thumbnail: Page 
419
    419
  • Thumbnail: Page 
420
    420
  • Thumbnail: Page 
421
    421
  • Thumbnail: Page 
422
    422
  • Thumbnail: Page 
423
    423
  • Thumbnail: Page 
424
    424