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Incorporating the Rules Committee: An Extension of the Ferejohn/Shipan Model

Phillip A. Huxtable
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
Vol. 10, No. 1 (Apr., 1994), pp. 160-167
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/764818
Page Count: 8
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Incorporating the Rules Committee: An Extension of the Ferejohn/Shipan Model
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Abstract

This article uses a spatial modeling approach to examine congressional oversight of bureaucratic agencies. The model used here builds on work by John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan. By modifying one of their assumptions and adding a Rules Committee to the model, I find equilibria that differ significantly from that of the Ferejohn/Shipan model. I find that the existence of an autonomous Rules Committee keeps agency policies from deviating much from the preferences of the House's median member. Somewhat surprisingly, I find that policy outcomes move closer to the House median member's ideal point as the ideal point of the Rules Committee moves away from the House.

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