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Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design

Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
Vol. 7, Special Issue: [Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January 1991] (1991), pp. 24-52
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/764957
Page Count: 29
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Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
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