Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support

Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986

Nolan M. McCarty and Keith T. Poole
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
Vol. 11, No. 2 (Oct., 1995), pp. 282-312
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/764999
Page Count: 31
  • Get Access
  • Download ($42.00)
  • Cite this Item
If you need an accessible version of this item please contact JSTOR User Support
Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986
Preview not available

Abstract

One of the most important American political institutions is the executive veto. The Founding Fathers sought to create an institution that would both protect the executive branch from encroachments of the legislature as well as provide an additional safeguard against "unwise" measures that might be passed. These concerns were weighed against concerns about executive usurpation of legislative power. The extent to which the veto serves to preserve this delicate balance is a question that remains largely unanswered. Few will dispute that the president plays a role in the legislative process. The question remains one of extent. Is the legislative role of the president within the confines of the formal powers enumerated in the constitution, or have additional informal powers emerged? In this analysis, we try to measure the influence of the president in the legislative process. We develop an empirical model based on several current theories of executive-legislative bargaining. The model we estimate is a generalized version of the legislative agenda control model. While we find strong evidence for the basic structure of the legislative agenda control model, we reject several of its predictions. We argue that many of these rejections may be due to presidential influence on the agenda and/or to incomplete information.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
282
    282
  • Thumbnail: Page 
283
    283
  • Thumbnail: Page 
284
    284
  • Thumbnail: Page 
285
    285
  • Thumbnail: Page 
286
    286
  • Thumbnail: Page 
287
    287
  • Thumbnail: Page 
288
    288
  • Thumbnail: Page 
289
    289
  • Thumbnail: Page 
290
    290
  • Thumbnail: Page 
291
    291
  • Thumbnail: Page 
292
    292
  • Thumbnail: Page 
293
    293
  • Thumbnail: Page 
294
    294
  • Thumbnail: Page 
295
    295
  • Thumbnail: Page 
296
    296
  • Thumbnail: Page 
297
    297
  • Thumbnail: Page 
298
    298
  • Thumbnail: Page 
299
    299
  • Thumbnail: Page 
300
    300
  • Thumbnail: Page 
301
    301
  • Thumbnail: Page 
302
    302
  • Thumbnail: Page 
303
    303
  • Thumbnail: Page 
304
    304
  • Thumbnail: Page 
305
    305
  • Thumbnail: Page 
306
    306
  • Thumbnail: Page 
307
    307
  • Thumbnail: Page 
308
    308
  • Thumbnail: Page 
309
    309
  • Thumbnail: Page 
310
    310
  • Thumbnail: Page 
311
    311
  • Thumbnail: Page 
312
    312