Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration

Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom
Public Administration Review
Vol. 31, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1971), pp. 203-216
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration
DOI: 10.2307/974676
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Page Count: 14
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Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration

Notes and References

This item contains 132 references.

  • *
    PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Vol. XXIV (March1964), pp. 62-63.
  • **
    Papers on Non-Market De- cision Making, Public Choice first appeared in Spring 1968.
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