Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access your personal account or get JSTOR access through your library or other institution:

login

Log in to your personal account or through your institution.

Institutional Arrangements and the Management of Common-Pool Resources

Shui Yan Tang
Public Administration Review
Vol. 51, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1991), pp. 42-51
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration
DOI: 10.2307/976635
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/976635
Page Count: 10
  • Download ($25.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Cite this Item
Institutional Arrangements and the Management of Common-Pool Resources
Preview not available

Abstract

How do institutional arrangements affect the management of environmental resource systems? The administration of irrigation systems, fisheries, grazing lands, and other 'common-pool resources' is an increasingly important public sector activity. Relying on a cross-national study of thirty-six irrigation systems, Shui Yan Tang provides some insights into the effectiveness of alternative means for organizing water appropriation and maintenance tasks. Building on a distinction between bureaucratic and community systems, Tang finds reliance on bureaucratic arrangements to be less effective in managing water resource appropriation to farmers. Community arrangements, in contrast, proved more sensitive to the local needs of end users. While noting the potential relevance of bureaucratic structures in the construction, production, and distribution of common-pool resources, Tang's work indicates the importance of considering non-bureaucratic alternatives when designing delivery systems for such resources.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
42
    42
  • Thumbnail: Page 
43
    43
  • Thumbnail: Page 
44
    44
  • Thumbnail: Page 
45
    45
  • Thumbnail: Page 
46
    46
  • Thumbnail: Page 
47
    47
  • Thumbnail: Page 
48
    48
  • Thumbnail: Page 
49
    49
  • Thumbnail: Page 
50
    50
  • Thumbnail: Page 
51
    51