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The Basic Problems of Phenomenology

The Basic Problems of Phenomenology

Martin Heidegger
Translation, Introduction, and Lexicon by Albert Hofstadter
Copyright Date: 1982
Edition: 2
Published by: Indiana University Press
Pages: 432
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1bz3w2k
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    The Basic Problems of Phenomenology
    Book Description:

    A lecture course that Martin Heidegger gave in 1927, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology continues and extends explorations begun in Being and Time. In this text, Heidegger provides the general outline of his thinking about the fundamental problems of philosophy, which he treats by means of phenomenology, and which he defines and explains as the basic problem of ontology.

    eISBN: 978-0-253-01326-2
    Subjects: Philosophy
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Table of Contents

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  1. Front Matter (pp. i-iv)
  2. Table of Contents (pp. v-x)
  3. TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE (pp. xi-xiv)
    Albert Hofstadter
  4. Translator’s Introduction (pp. xv-xxxiv)

    At the very outset ofBasic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger notes that the work represents “a new elaboration of division 3 of part 1 ofBeing and Time” (p. 1). The present introduction is intended to indicate how this description might be understood.

    The title of the projected but unpublished division 3 of part 1 ofBeing and Timewas “Time and Being,” which Heidegger explained as “the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being.”¹Basic Problems of Phenomenologydoes indeed perform this task of explication, and at the end of the course Heidegger announces...

  5. Introduction (pp. 1-24)

    This course¹ sets for itself the task of posingthe basic problems of phenomenology, elaborating them, and proceeding to some extent toward their solution. Phenomenology must develop its concept out of what it takes as its theme and how it investigates its object. Our considerations are aimed at theinherent contentandinner systematic relationshipsof the basic problems. The goal is to achieve a fundamental illumination of these problems.

    In negative terms this means that our purpose is not to acquire historical knowledge about the circumstances of the modern movement in philosophy called phenomenology. We shall be dealing not...

  6. PART ONE Critical Phenomenological Discussion of Some Traditional Theses about Being
    • Chapter One Kant’s Thesis: Being Is Not a Real Predicate (pp. 27-76)

      Kant discusses his thesis that being is not a real predicate in two places. One is a small essay,Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes[The sole possible argument for a demonstration of God’s existence) (1763). This work belongs to Kant’s so-called pre-critical period, the period before theCritique of Pure Reason(1781). It falls into three parts. Our thesis is dealt with in the first part, which discusses the basic questions and divides into four considerations: (1) “On existence in general”; (2) “On inner possibility insofar as it presupposes an existence”; (3) “On absolutely necessary...

    • Chapter Two The Thesis of Medieval Ontology Derived from Aristotle: To the Constitution of the Being of a Being There Belong Essence and Existence (pp. 77-121)

      The discussion of the first thesis, being is not a real predicate, aimed at clarifying the sense of being, existence, and at determining Kant’s interpretation of existence more radically in regard to its task. It was emphasized that existence differs from reality. Reality itself was not yet made a problem, nor was its possible relation to existence or even the distinction between the two. Since reality in the Kantian sense means nothing but essentia, the discussion of the second thesis, concerning essentia and existentia, includes all the questions about their relationship that were raised in earlier philosophy and that are...

    • Chapter Three The Thesis of Modern Ontology: The Basic Ways of Being Are the Being of Nature (Res Extensa) and the Being of Mind (Res Cogitans) (pp. 122-176)

      The discussion of the first two theses led us in each case to tum the question of the meaning of actuality, or of thingness and actuality, back to the Dasein’s comportments. Using as a clue the intentional structure of these comportments and the understanding of being at each time immanent in each comportment, we were thus enabled to ask about the constitution of the being to which in each instance the comportment comports: the perceived of perception in its perceivedness, the product (producible) of production in its producedness. The two comportments at the same time revealed an interconnection. All producing...

    • Chapter Four The Thesis of Logic: Every Being, Regardless of Its Particular Way of Being, Can Be Addressed and Talked About by Means of the “Is.” The Being of the Copula (pp. 177-224)

      In our account of the fourth thesis we meet with a very central problem, one that is recurrently discussed in philosophy but only in a limited horizon—the question of being in the sense of the “is,” the copula in assertion, in the logos. The “is” has received this designation “copula” because of its combinatory position in the proposition intermediate between subject and predicate: Sis P. Corresponding to the fundamental position in which the “is” occurs in the logos or assertion, and in conformity with the progress of the problem’s development in ancient ontology, this “is” as copula was dealt...

  7. PART TWO The Fundamental Ontological Question of the Meaning of Being in General The Basic Structures and Basic Ways of Being
    • Chapter One The Problem of the Ontological Difference (pp. 227-330)

      It is not without reason that the problem of the distinction between being in general and beings occurs here in first place. For the purpose of the discussion of this difference is to make it possible first of all to get to see thematically and put into investigation, in a clear and methodically secure way, the like of being in distinction from beings. The possibility of ontology, of philosophy as a science, stands and falls with the possibility of a sufficiently clear accomplishment of this differentiation between being and beings and accordingly with the possibility of negotiating the passage from...

  8. EDITOR’S EPILOGUE (pp. 331-332)
    Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann

    This book reproduces the text of the course of lectures given under the same title during the summer semester of 1927 at the University of Mar burg/Lahn.

    Mr. Fritz Heidegger provided the handwritten prototype. The typewritten copy and the manuscript were collated by the editor. The passages not yet deciphered by Mr. Fritz Heidegger—above all, the insertions and marginal notes on the right side of the manuscript pages—had to be carried over so as to fill out the text. The completed copy was then additionally compared with a transcription of the lectures by Simon Moser (Karlsruhe), a student...

  9. Translator’s Appendix: A Note on the Da and the Dasein (pp. 333-338)
  10. Lexicon (pp. 339-396)