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Optimal Doubling Strategy against a Suboptimal Opponent
Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos and Özgür Şimşek
Journal of Applied Probability
Vol. 42, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 867-872
Published by: Applied Probability Trust
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040863
Page Count: 6
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Games, Optimal strategies, Backgammon, Expected values, Doubling time, Contour lines
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For two-person zero-sum games, where the probability of each player winning is a continuous function of time and is known to both players, the mutually optimal strategy for proposing and accepting a doubling of the game value is known. We present an algorithm for deriving the optimal doubling strategy of a player who is aware of the suboptimal strategy followed by the opponent. We also present numerical results about the magnitude of the benefits; the results support the claim that repeated application of the algorithm by both players leads to the mutually optimal strategy.
Journal of Applied Probability © 2005 Applied Probability Trust