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Advancing U.S. Leadership in Nonproliferation and Nuclear Energy through Effective Partnerships
|
2014
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AIR-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES
|
2019
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ALTERNATIVES TO THE GROUND-BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT
|
2021
|
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Anatomizing Non-State Threats to Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure::
The Pakistani Neo-Taliban
|
2011
|
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Applying ARPA-I:
A Proven Model for Transportation Infrastructure
|
2023
|
|
The B61 Life-Extension Program::
Increasing NATO Nuclear Capability and Precision Low-Yield Strikes
|
2011
|
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Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning
|
2006
|
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CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE of NORTH KOREA
|
2019
|
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Eight Recommendations for Improving Transparency in US Arms Transfers
|
2010
|
|
Flying Blind::
The Rise, Fall, and Possible Resurrection of Science Policy Advice in the United States
|
2004
|
|
FRANCE’S CHOICE FOR NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION:
Why Low-Enriched Uranium was Chosen
|
2016
|
|
From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence::
A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons
|
2009
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The Future of Nuclear Power in the United States
|
2012
|
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Increasing National Resilience through an Open Disaster Data Initiative
|
2023
|
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AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO DETERRENCE POSTURE:
REVIEWING CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN A NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY
|
2021
|
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IRANʹS NUCLEAR ODYSSEY:
COSTS AND RISKS
|
2013
|
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LIFE-OF-SHIP REACTORS AND ACCELERATED TESTING:
On Naval Propulsion Fuels and Reactors
|
2017
|
|
The MANPADS Threat and International Efforts to Address It:
Ten Years after Mombasa
|
2013
|
|
Missions for Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War
|
2005
|
|
A More Responsible Digital Surveillance Future:
Multi-stakeholder Perspectives and Cohesive State & Local, Federal, and International Actions
|
2021
|
|
Moving Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems to Global Deployment
|
2015
|
|
Naval Nuclear Propulsion::
Assessing Benefits and Risks
|
2015
|
|
THE NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT CHALLENGES OF NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION:
A Quid Pro Quo for Nuclear-Armed States and NPT Non-Nuclear Weapon States
|
2017
|
|
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
|
2012
|
|
NUCLEAR DYNAMICS:
In a Multipolar Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense World
|
2017
|
|
NUCLEAR MONITORING AND VERIFICATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE::
SEVEN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE PROCESS
|
2017
|
|
A NUCLEAR-FREE MIRAGE?:
Obstacles to President Obama’s Goal of a Nuclear Weapons Free World
|
2011
|
|
One Small Step::
Anticipatory Diplomacy in Outer Space
|
2023
|
|
Over the Line:
The Implications of China’s ADIZ Intrusions in Northeast Asia
|
2020
|
|
Placing Global Biosecurity Engagement Programs under the Umbrella of Global Health Security
|
2014
|
|
Public Perspectives on the US Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force
|
2021
|
|
Recommendations to Prevent Catastrophic Threats
|
2012
|
|
Regulating Japanese Nuclear Power in the Wake of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident
|
2013
|
|
Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran::
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
|
2012
|
|
SILOED THINKING:
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE GROUND-BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT
|
2021
|
|
Small Arms, Terrorism and the OAS Firearms Convention
|
2004
|
|
State of the Federal Clean Energy Workforce:
How Improved Talent Practices Can Help the Department of Energy Meet the Moment
|
2023
|
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Suggestions about Japan’s Nuclear Fuel Recycling Policy Based on U.S. Concerns
|
2016
|
|
Temporary Work Visa Holders in the United States, By the Numbers
|
2020
|
|
Towards Enhanced Safeguards for Iran’s Nuclear Program
|
2011
|
|
Trimming Nuclear Excess:
Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces
|
2012
|
|
Understanding the Dragon Shield::
Likelihood and Implications of Chinese Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense
|
2015
|
|
Upsetting the Reset ::
The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense
|
2011
|
|
Use of Attribution and Forensic Science in Addressing Biological Weapon Threats::
A Multi-Faceted Study
|
2016
|
|
Use of Microbial Forensics in the Middle East/North Africa Region
|
2016
|
|
Using Enrichment Capacity to Estimate Iran’s Breakout Potential
|
2011
|
|
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR A NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN:
Nuclear Verification Capabilities Independent Task Force of the Federation of American Scientists
|
2014
|
|
WHAT IS THE SOLE PURPOSE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
|
2021
|
|
Will Iran Give Up Twenty Percent Enrichment?
|
2010
|