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Internet commerce has led to novel forms of contracting that raise challenging legal and regulatory questions. For instance, many online sellers do not present standard form terms until after consumers purchase their product, or place them in inconspicuous links, making it hard for buyers to read them and comparison shop. Regulators and consumer advocates fear that this practice undermines the notion of assent, making consumers vulnerable to seller exploitation. Recent proposals seek to curb the potential for seller abuse through increasing contract disclosure and prohibiting certain onerous dispute resolution clauses, such as forum selection clauses. If such interventions are developed in the absence of clear evidence of advantage-taking, however, they risk distorting efficient business practices or imposing unnecessary costs. In addition, certain regulations, such as increased disclosure, might simply be ineffective. This article reviews new empirical evidence on these questions from studies of software End User License Agreements and discusses the policy implications of this evidence.
Current issues are now on the Chicago Journals website. Read the latest issue.The Supreme Court Economic Review (SCER) is a faculty-edited, peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary law and economics series. The journal has a particular focus on economic and social science analysis of judicial decision-making, institutional analysis of law and legal structures, political economy and public choice issues regarding courts and other decision makers, and the relationship between legal and political institutions and the institutions of a free society governed by constitutions and the rule of law. The series also publishes special symposium issues that build on SCER’s traditional focus on the intersection between law and economics. The contributors include renowned legal scholars, economists, and policy makers, and consistently ranks among the most influential journals of law and economics.
Since its origins in 1890 as one of the three main divisions of the University of Chicago, The University of Chicago Press has embraced as its mission the obligation to disseminate scholarship of the highest standard and to publish serious works that promote education, foster public understanding, and enrich cultural life. Today, the Journals Division publishes more than 70 journals and hardcover serials, in a wide range of academic disciplines, including the social sciences, the humanities, education, the biological and medical sciences, and the physical sciences.
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