Nowhere is China’s aid program both more important and yet less understood than with North Korea. This article examines two puzzles: China’s aid to North Korea coexists with a discriminatory trading relationship, and China continues to provide aid even as it tightens economic sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear program.
The only bimonthly academic journal of contemporary Asian affairs published in the US, Asian Survey provides in-depth analysis on contemporary Asia and international affairs. For over forty years, academics, government and security officials, business executives, and journalists have relied on Asian Survey to keep them well informed on a broad spectrum of current Asian issues and developments. Leading American and international scholars provide readers with authoritative reviews and analyses concerning the politics, economics, and foreign relations of countries east of Afghanistan to the Pacific Rim. In each issue, contributors offer valuable "insider perspectives" on important current events, making Asian Survey one of the most widely read and quoted sources for developments in Asia. Scholarly analysis and commentary offer strategies for the future, and timely special issues focus on areas of crisis and change.
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