Cheryl Abbate's (2016) article in this journal makes the case that many nonhuman animals are “political” in the Aristotelian sense (Politics; Nicomachean Ethics). Moreover, Abbate rejects the claim that anthrôpos (Homo sapiens) is the most political of animals. While the aim to deflate often overexaggerated distinctions between us and other animals is laudable, in the following I suggest that Abbate's evidence from cognitive ethology, and her application of evolutionary principles, fall short of demonstrating other animals to be as political as anthrôpos.
The Journal of Animal Ethics is devoted to the exploration of progressive thought about animals. It is multidisciplinary in nature and international in scope. It covers theoretical and applied aspects of animal ethics of interest to academics from the humanities and the sciences, as well as professionals working in the field of animal protection.
Founded in 1918, the University of Illinois Press (www.press.uillinois.edu) ranks as one of the country's larger and most distinguished university presses. The Press publishes more than 120 new books and 30 scholarly journals each year in an array of subjects including American history, labor history, sports history, folklore, food, film, American music, American religion, African American studies, women's studies, and Abraham Lincoln. The Press is a founding member of the Association of American University Presses as well as the History Cooperative, an online collection of more than 20 history journals.
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