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Unconventional Warfare: American and Soviet Approaches
Slavko N. Bjelajac
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Vol. 341, Unconventional Warfare (May, 1962), pp. 74-81
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1034145
Page Count: 8
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Unconventional warfare is a weapons system of hot and cold wars which is utilized for achievement of political and military goals. It is a type of warfare used equally by conventional military forces, paramilitary organizations, and civilian populations. The Sino-Soviet bloc's governments consider it an indispensable weapon of their political and military aggression and for promoting the goals of world communism. It has become the principal weapon of revolutionary and anticolonial movements and of wars of liberation. The preparedness of the United States and her allies in meeting such wars intelligently and effectively must be much more than of a military nature. The battle must be waged for the minds and hearts of peoples. The character of counter-insurgency requires techniques of a pacifying rather than a destructive nature. The United States national strategy and policy in regard to unconventional warfare can be used for safeguarding United States and allied interests in the period of peaceful coexistence; for the protection of rear areas and communication zones of United States expeditionary forces in both limited and general war; as an offensive and defensive weapons system for supporting the United States and allied total war effort; and, finally, for the protection of vital industrial complexes and key industries in the United States and in allied and friendly countries in the event of general war.
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science © 1962 American Academy of Political and Social Science