If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Journal Article

A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries

Theodore C. Bergstrom
Journal of Political Economy
Vol. 97, No. 5 (Oct., 1989), pp. 1138-1159
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1831889
Page Count: 22
Were these topics helpful?

Select the topics that are inaccurate.

  • Read Online (Free)
  • Download ($14.00)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Save
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries
Preview not available

Abstract

Gary Becker's "Rotten Kid theorem" asserts that if all family members receive gifts of money income from a benevolent household member, then even if the household head does not precommit to an incentive plan for family members, it will be in the interest of selfish family members to maximize total family income. I show by examples that the Rotten Kid theorem is not true without assuming transferable utility. I find a simple condition on utility functions that is necessary and sufficient for there to be the kind of transferable utility needed for a Rotten Kid theorem. While restrictive, these conditions still allow one to apply the strong conclusions of the Rotten Kid theorem in an interesting class of examples.