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Job Market Signaling

Michael Spence
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Vol. 87, No. 3 (Aug., 1973), pp. 355-374
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1882010
Page Count: 20
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Job Market Signaling
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Abstract

I. Introduction 355.--2. Hiring as investment under uncertainty, 356.--3 Applicant signaling, 358.--4. Informational feedback and the definition of equilibrium, 359.--5. Properties of informational equilibria: An example, 361.--6. The informational impact of indices, 368.--Conclusions, 374.

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