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Stability in Voting
Michael Dummett and Robin Farquharson
Vol. 29, No. 1 (Jan., 1961), pp. 33-43
Published by: The Econometric Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1907685
Page Count: 11
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Voting is presented as an n-person majority game, in which preferences are ordinal. A condition on the preferences, substantially weaker than one postulated by D. Black, is shown to be sufficient for "stability" in such games.
Econometrica © 1961 The Econometric Society