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Seniority in Legislatures
Richard D. McKelvey and Raymond Riezman
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 86, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 951-965
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1964347
Page Count: 15
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We construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogeneously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trival seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.
The American Political Science Review © 1992 American Political Science Association