Access

You are not currently logged in.

Access JSTOR through your library or other institution:

login

Log in through your institution.

If You Use a Screen Reader

This content is available through Read Online (Free) program, which relies on page scans. Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Journal Article

Seniority in Legislatures

Richard D. McKelvey and Raymond Riezman
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 86, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 951-965
DOI: 10.2307/1964347
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1964347
Page Count: 15
  • Read Online (Free)
  • Subscribe ($19.50)
  • Add to My Lists
  • Cite this Item
Since scans are not currently available to screen readers, please contact JSTOR User Support for access. We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
Seniority in Legislatures
Preview not available

Abstract

We construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogeneously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trival seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.

Page Thumbnails

  • Thumbnail: Page 
951
    951
  • Thumbnail: Page 
952
    952
  • Thumbnail: Page 
953
    953
  • Thumbnail: Page 
954
    954
  • Thumbnail: Page 
955
    955
  • Thumbnail: Page 
956
    956
  • Thumbnail: Page 
957
    957
  • Thumbnail: Page 
958
    958
  • Thumbnail: Page 
959
    959
  • Thumbnail: Page 
960
    960
  • Thumbnail: Page 
961
    961
  • Thumbnail: Page 
962
    962
  • Thumbnail: Page 
963
    963
  • Thumbnail: Page 
964
    964
  • Thumbnail: Page 
965
    965