This paper is a reexamination of "Two Dogmas..." in the light of Quine's ongoing debate with Carnap over analyticity. It shows, first, that 'analytic' is a technical term within Carnap's epistemology. As such it is intelligible, and Carnap's position can meet Quine's objections. Second, it shows that the core of Quine's objection is that he (Quine) has an alternative epistemology to advance, one which appears to make no room for analyticity. Finally, the paper shows that Quine's alternative epistemology is itself open to very serious objections. Quine is not thereby refuted, but neither can Carnap's analyticity be dismissed as dogma.
Erkenntnis is a philosophical journal publishing papers committed in one way or another to the philosophical attitude which is signified by the label "analytic philosophy". It concentrates on those philosophical fields which are particularly inspired by this attitude, although other topics are welcome as well. Currently we cover topics like: epistemology, philosophies of science, logic and language, ontology, philosophical psychology and practical philosophy. In recent years, philosophers standing quite outside the pale of analytic philosophy have also paid careful, and indeed most welcome, attention both to precision of concept and language, and to well-grounded foundations. Erkenntnis provides for them, and for philosophers of all persuasions, a place of meeting, of discussion, and of disputation.
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Erkenntnis (1975-)
© 1991 Springer