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Journal Article
Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma
Robert Jervis
World Politics
Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jan., 1978), pp. 167-214
Published
by: Cambridge University Press
DOI: 10.2307/2009958
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958
Page Count: 48
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Topics: Military defense, Security dilemma, World wars, Missiles, Navies, Territories, Forts
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Abstract
International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (i.e., policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. Two approaches are used to show when and why this dilemma operates less strongly and cooperation is more likely. First, the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma is used to demonstrate that cooperation is more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the costs of mutual noncooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate. Second, the security dilemma is ameliorated when the defense has the advantage over the offense and when defensive postures differ from offensive ones. These two variables, which can generate four possible security worlds, are influenced by geography and technology.
World Politics
© 1978 Trustees of Princeton University