Journal Article
Epistemic Normativity
Hilary Kornblith
Synthese
Vol. 94, No. 3 (Mar., 1993), pp. 357-376
Published
by: Springer
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20117752
Page Count: 20
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Topics: Cognition, Normativity, Truth, Toasters, Reason, Naturalized epistemology, Justified beliefs, Belief, Naturalistic psychology
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Abstract
This paper examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? A semantic approach to this question, due to Alvin Goldman, is examined and found unacceptable. Instead, accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires are argued to be most promising. All of these accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. It is argued that such an account may be offered, grounding our epistemic norms in desire, which nevertheless makes these imperatives universal. The account is contrasted with some recent work of Stephen Stich.
Synthese
© 1993 Springer