The lack of success of the 1807-1809 Embargo by the United States has generally been attributed, first, to a lack of effective enforcement, and, second, to an inability to inflict greater economic damage on Great Britain than was suffered by the United States. This paper challenges both explanations. It is argued, first, that the Embargo did effectively reduce both countries to autarky. It is argued, second, that in autarky the relative price in Britain of agricultural products that had previously been imported rose by more than the relative price in the United States of manufactured goods that had previously been imported.
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