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Institutions and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China
Edmund Malesky, Regina Abrami and Yu Zheng
Vol. 43, No. 4 (July 2011), pp. 401-419
Published by: Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University of New York
Page Count: 19
You can always find the topics here!Topics: Income inequality, Political parties, Voting, Democracy, Authoritarianism, Political candidates, Economic development, Public expenditures, Elites, Gross domestic product
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Despite the fact that China and Vietnam have been the world's two fastest growing economies over the past two decades, their income inequality patterns are very different. An examination of the political institutions in the two countries shows that profound differences between these polities influence distributional choices. In particular, as compared to China, elite institutions in Vietnam encourage the construction of broader policymaking coalitions, have more competitive selection processes, and place more constraints on executive decision making. As a result, stronger political motivations exist for Vietnamese leaders to provide equalizing transfers that limit inequality growth among provinces than for Chinese leaders.
Comparative Politics © 2011 Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University of New York