In German criminal law science the term „Normentheorie“ (theory of norms) is associated with Karl Binding. Binding founded his system of criminal law on the differentiation between primary rules of conduct, adressed to citizens, and secundary rules of sanctions, adressed to court of law. Andreas Hoyer follows with his seminal book about „Strafrechtsdogmatik nach Armin Kaufmann. Lebendiges und Totes in Armin Kaufmanns Normentheorie“ this tradition of legal philosophy. Simultaneously he breaks with the conventional dualistic concept of norms accepting only rules of sanctions. Moreover his concept of „alethic norms“ banishes the terms „duty“ and „right“ from jurisprudence. Therefore he explaines crime along the lines of purchase order („robbery costs five years“) and uses it as a basis for a new system of criminal law. The main objection against Hoyer is the difficulty of drawing a distinction between taxation and punishment. Hoyer also neglects the function of law to provide orientation independent from sanctions. He ignores that the penal law code is an accessory law code: Penal laws threaten those who break the rules of the community with punishment — and therefore presuppose these rules and do not create them. Finally looking at the victim of a crime shows that he/she would hardly agree with a contract disadvantaging him/her.
Das Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, herausgegeben im Auftrag der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR), leistet seit 1907 philosophische Grundlagenforschung innerhalb der Rechtswissenschaft: Schwerpunkt ist das geistige Fundament des Sozial- und Rechtslebens sowie seine Verflechtungen und Auswirkungen. Die Zeitschrift berücksichtigt dabei alle Denkrichtungen der Gegenwart, besonderer Wert wird auf eine internationale Ausrichtung gelegt. Alle Artikel beweisen ihr wissenschaftliches Niveau in einem peer review-Verfahren. Das Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie ("Archive for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy") is published on behalf of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR). It has carried out fundamental research in the philosophy of jurisprudence since 1907 with a focus on the intellectual foundation of social life and legal culture as well as their interconnections and consequences. The journal includes all contemporary schools of thought and places particular value on an international perspective. The high scholarly quality of all articles is ensured by a peer-review process.
Franz Steiner is one of Germany's most prominent academic publishing houses. Our focal point is ancient history, but also social and economic history, as well as history of science; furthermore regional studies, Eastern European history and transatlantic studies. We oversee more than 150 serial publications as well as 28 periodicals and publish such renowned series as Historia, Hermes and Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie. We only publish those projects which proved their academic value in external anonymous peer assessments.
This item is part of a JSTOR Collection.
For terms and use, please refer to our
ARSP: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
© 2001 Franz Steiner Verlag