This article reviews research from the five income-maintenance experiments in Canada and the United States. After sketching the historical and political context of the experiments, we compare their designs and discuss some important analytic difficulties. Our primary focus is the work-incentive issue, both nonstructural estimates of the experimental effects and elasticity estimates of structural labor-supply functions. We provide initial estimates of nonstructural and structural models for the Canadian experiment. We discuss more briefly some non-work-response findings associated with a guaranteed annual income and offer some personal comments on social experimentation and the policy process.
Current issues are now on the Chicago Journals website. Read the latest issue.Since 1983, the Journal of Labor Economics (JOLE) has presented international research on issues affecting social and private behavior, and the economy. JOLE’s contributors investigate various aspects of labor economics, including supply and demand of labor services, personnel economics, distribution of income, unions and collective bargaining, applied and policy issues in labor economics, and labor markets and demographics.
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© 1993 The University of Chicago Press
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