The Journal of Law and Religion is an interfaith, interdisciplinary peer-reviewed English language academic and professional journal devoted to issues that engage both theology and law. The Journal publishes a diverse range of scholarly work from many nations, disciplines, faith traditions, and perspectives, including historical studies, jurisprudence and theology, work on the vocations of law and religion, and studies on the interplay of law and religion in social, political and other arenas. Academics, legal and religious professionals, and others engaged in social and political thought and policy-making make up its readership. The Journal is governed by a national editorial board of legal and religious academics and professionals, and assisted by an international advisory committee.
Cambridge University Press (www.cambridge.org) is the publishing division of the University of Cambridge, one of the world’s leading research institutions and winner of 81 Nobel Prizes. Cambridge University Press is committed by its charter to disseminate knowledge as widely as possible across the globe. It publishes over 2,500 books a year for distribution in more than 200 countries. Cambridge Journals publishes over 250 peer-reviewed academic journals across a wide range of subject areas, in print and online. Many of these journals are the leading academic publications in their fields and together they form one of the most valuable and comprehensive bodies of research available today. For more information, visit http://journals.cambridge.org.
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Journal of Law and Religion
© 2008 Cambridge University Press
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