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Journal Article
U.S. Foreign Aid and U.N. Voting: Did Reagan's Linkage Strategy Buy Deference or Defiance?
Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Steven W. Hook
International Studies Quarterly
Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep., 1991), pp. 295-312
Published
by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
DOI: 10.2307/2600701
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600701
Page Count: 18
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Topics: Coincidence, Foreign aid, Foreign policy, International cooperation, Voting patterns, Economic sanctions, Voting behavior, Guideline adherence
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Abstract
The Reagan administration's 1986 policy initiative linking the allocation of U.S. foreign aid to recipient voting behavior in the U.N. General Assembly is evaluated. Aid levels and voting patterns are examined prior to and after the implementation of the declared bargaining policy. To maximize validity, the data are subjected to a variety of statistical treatments, including construction of a cross-lagged path model. None of the results emerging from these treatments produced statistical evidence that a relationship was present. The data demonstrate that the strategy did not produce the effects envisioned by its framers: The policy fell short of its goal of eliciting compliance behavior through threats of economic sanctions. Contending reasons for the strategy's failure are advanced in a concluding interpretation.
International Studies Quarterly
© 1991 Oxford University Press