This paper describes a multidisciplinary project concerned with the design and management of hazardous organizations that achieve extremely high levels of reliable and safe operations. The organizations in which the research is being conducted are the Federal Aviation Administration's Air Traffic Control system, Pacific Gas and Electric Company's electrical distribution system, and two nuclear aircraft carriers of the United States Navy. The paper describes the research strategy and then presents some initial organizational paradoxes and findings. These are discussed in terms of describing the organizations, decision making, interdependence, the "culture" of high reliability and adaptation to technological change. The paper concludes with the admonition that managers in hazardous organizations should consider the cost of safeguards against organizational catastrophes versus the costs of catastrophe (in money, lives and public outcry).
Sara Miller McCune founded SAGE Publishing in 1965 to support the dissemination of usable knowledge and educate a global community. SAGE is a leading international provider of innovative, high-quality content publishing more than 900 journals and over 800 new books each year, spanning a wide range of subject areas. A growing selection of library products includes archives, data, case studies and video. SAGE remains majority owned by our founder and after her lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures the company’s continued independence. Principal offices are located in Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC and Melbourne. www.sagepublishing.com
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